Abstract. The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not properly analyzed the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.
Introduction
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) concept has become a widely used approach to study the exercise of market power by sellers in multi-unit auction environments. SFE models assume that each seller submits a supply function for divisible output to the auctioneer, who sets a uniform market clearing price. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) (hereafter KM) characterize supply function equilibria in environments for which product demand is uncertain. They show that there are multiple equilibria when the range of demand variation is bounded. Roughly speaking, these equilibria are contained in a range of prices between the Cournot price and the competitive price.
The SFE concept has found its widest application in the analysis of wholesale electricity auctions. Many of these auctions are run as uniform price, multi-unit auctions in which power sellers submit offer schedules indicating their willingness to supply. Examples of applications of the SFE concept to wholesale electricity markets include Green and Newbery (1992) , Newbery (1998), Rudkevich, et al (1998) , Baldick and Hogan (2002) , and Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004) . These papers consider a variety of extensions of the KM model, including production capacity constraints, cost asymmetries, potential entry, multi-step cost functions, and forward contracting.
Recent assessments of wholesale electricity market performance have emphasized the role of the extent of excess production capacity in the market and the ability of firms to influence the market price by withholding production (see Bushnell, Knittel and Wolak (1999), Joskow and Kahn (2001) , Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) , and Perekhodtsev, et al (2002) ). The term "pivotal firm" has been used to describe a supplier that is able to dictate the price in the auction by withholding some portion of its production from the auction. One or more pivotal firms are most likely to be present when demand (or, load) is near its peak, when available production capacity in the market is limited relative to the peak demand, and when firms' capacities are asymmetrically distributed.
While prior applications of the SFE approach to electricity markets have considered a variety of extensions of the basic SFE model, these applications have not adequately addressed the impact of production capacity constraints nor have they examined the potential role of pivotal firms. In this paper we formulate a simple model for which the notion of a pivotal firm has a natural interpretation. We assume that demand is uncertain and perfectly inelastic up to a maximum price. We focus on the case in which firms' marginal costs are identical and constant up to production capacity. In the symmetric model, firms have identical capacities as well as costs. In the asymmetric model, firms have differing capacities. As in other SFE models with bounded demand variation, there is a continuum of equilibria.
The introduction of production capacity constraints into a SFE model changes the analysis in a fundamental manner. The SFE model without capacity constraints utilizes quasiconcavity of firms' profit functions and first-order necessary conditions to determine optimal price-quantity pairs along with the curvature of the equilibrium supply function. When a firm's rivals have capacity constraints the firm's profit function need not be quasi-concave in price. In addition to a locally optimal price-quantity pair associated with the SFE necessary condition, a pivotal firm may have a global profit optimum at the maximum price, or price cap. By withholding output, a pivotal firm can unilaterally move the market price to the price cap. We examine the connection between pivotal firms and the set of supply function equilibria. In symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model we show that the presence of pivotal firms alters the set of equilibria. The size of the equilibrium set depends on observable market characteristics such as the amount of industry excess capacity, the demand distribution, and the number of firms. We show that as the amount of industry excess capacity falls the set of symmetric supply function equilibria becomes smaller; the equilibria that are eliminated are the lowest-priced, most competitive equilibria. We also show that if the demand distribution is concentrated near its maximum value then there are asymmetric equilibria in which the maximum price occurs with probability one.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model formulation and explains preliminary results. In section 4 we consider the role of capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers in equilibrium predictions for a symmetric model. We show how the failure of quasiconcavity of profit as a function of price changes the problem of finding an optimal supply response to rivals' supply function strategies. We provide a complete characterization of symmetric supply function equilibria for all parameter configurations with a general demand distribution, which is the main contribution of this paper. We also describe two types of asymmetric equilibria that may arise. Section 5 provides a discussion of several issues, including asymmetric duopoly, increasing marginal costs, a comparison of SFE results with results from discrete-units bidding models, and equilibrium selection. Section 6 concludes.
Background

Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power
Wholesale electricity markets are particularly vulnerable to supplier market power. These markets are often organized as auctions in which firms submit offer schedules. Buyers in these auctions typically have little or no price sensitivity, so that the price elasticity of demand is close to zero. For example, buyers may be electricity distributors that are obligated to serve whatever quantity (load) their customers request at a fixed retail price. Electricity production by power generation firms is limited by capacity constraints. In many parts of the world, wholesale markets are linked together via a transmission grid. However, the ability of buyers to acquire power from distant generation firms may be limited by transmission capacity constraints. Taken together, these characteristics of wholesale electricity markets can yield significant market power for individual firms when demand is near its peak level. By unilaterally withholding output, a firm may be able to achieve a large price increase for its output, because of the combination of zero or low demand elasticity and limited production capacity of rival firms. For example, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) estimate that 50 percent of electricity expenditures in California in summer 2000 could be attributed to exercise of market power by generation firms.
The concept of a pivotal firm embodies an extreme type of market power that may be present in wholesale electricity markets. Suppose that market demand is perfectly inelastic up to a maximum price, or price cap, and firms have capacity constraints. If the market demand quantity exceeds the sum of production capacities of a firm's rivals with positive probability then that firm is said to be a pivotal firm. The firm is pivotal in the sense that it can move the market price to the price cap with positive probability by withholding output at prices below the cap. We develop a model in which the pivotal firm concept plays a crucial role in determining the set of equilibria.
The Residual Supply Index (RSI) is a market power index that was devised by the California Independent System Operator (see Sheffrin (2001 Sheffrin ( , 2002 ). RSI is calculated as the ratio of residual supply (total supply minus largest seller's capacity) to the total demand. Using summer 2000 peak hourly data from the California Power Exchange, Sheffrin (2001) found a negative correlation between the Lerner Index and RSI. She finds that when RSI is about 1.2, the average price-cost markup is zero. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) formulate a model in which each seller submits a supply function for divisible output as a function of the market price. There is no private information in their model, but the level of demand is uncertain at the time sellers submit supply functions. A uniform market price is determined by the intersection of the realization of the demand function and the aggregate supply function. The necessary conditions for equilibrium yield a system of differential equations that equilibrium supply functions must satisfy. If the range of demand variation is bounded then there is a continuum of equilibria; maximum prices associated with these equilibria range from the competitive price to the Cournot price. Green and Newbery (1992) applied the SFE model to analyze competition in the British wholesale electricity spot market. This market was run as a uniform price auction in which power sellers submit offer schedules. Green and Newbery argue that in a symmetric model, firms should select the symmetric equilibrium that yields the highest profit. Using demand and cost parameters to reflect conditions in the early years of the England and Wales wholesale electricity market, they show that at the most profitable symmetric SFE, the two dominant bulk electricity firms were predicted to choose supply functions that yield prices above marginal costs and cause substantial deadweight losses. Their SFE predicted prices were well above observed prices. Wolfram (1999) performs a more detailed analysis of pool outcomes in the England and Wales market. She also finds that the most profitable symmetric SFE yields predicted prices that are substantially above actual pool prices. Green and Newbery (1992) , Newbery (1998) , and Baldick and Hogan (2002) formulate SFE models that include production capacity constraints for firms. They argue, quite correctly, that if a solution of the SFE differential equation system violates any firm's capacity constraint, then that solution cannot be a SFE (see Green and Newbery (1992, pp. 938-939) and Baldick and Hogan (2002, p. 12) ). However, these papers neglect another effect of capacity constraints. Even when capacity constraints are non-binding for all firms at market clearing prices for a proposed vector of supply function strategies, these constraints have an impact on a firm's profitability of changing its supply function. A firm may find it profitable to change its supply by withholding output and bidding up the price, given that its rivals are capacity constrained. Prior analyses of SFE models have focused on local optimality conditions for a firm's supply response to rivals' supply strategies. Local optimality conditions yield the system of differential equations that a SFE must satisfy. However, when there are capacity constraints it is important to check for global optimality of a firm's supply response. Rivals' capacity constraints may yield a non-quasiconcave payoff function for which local optima need not be globally optimal. We develop the implications of this observation in Section 4 below.
Equilibrium Models
Using a formulation similar to ours, Holmberg (2008) assumes that demand exceeds total capacity with positive probability and shows that there is a unique symmetric SFE with supply functions that reach the price cap when output is equal to capacity. Our analysis assumes that demand is stochastic but never exceeds total industry capacity.. In Section 4 we show that the set of symmetric equilibria shrinks as total capacity falls, though in general, multiple equilibrium remain. Our assumption that total capacity exceeds peak demand permits our results to be compared to results from discrete-units bidding models of electricity markets, such as Fabra, et al (2006) . Delgado and Moreno (2004) provide another avenue for eliminating multiplicity of equilibria in a SFE model. They show that the only equilibrium in a supply function model with a single, certain demand function is the equilibrium that yields the Cournot price when the Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement is used. However this result changes when output is subject to capacity constraints. Delgado (2006) shows that the presence of sufficiently asymmetric capacity constraints may increase the number of Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium outcomes; the new outcomes involve prices below the Cournot price. Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006) compare discriminatory versus uniform-price electricity auctions in which firms submit offers to supply one or more discrete units of output.
Their model of a uniform-price auction shares many features of our model. We compare results from their discrete units analysis to those from our analysis of supply functions with infinitely divisible output in Section 5.3.
A Supply Function Equilibrium Model
Model Formulation
We assume that the level of demand is θ, a random variable that is independent of the market price. The level of demand is distributed according to ( 
Each firm i is assumed to choose a supply function, ( ) Right continuity of supply functions is more general than the assumption of differentiable supply functions that is employed in most SFE analyses. 3 Right continuity allows for two types of supply strategies that are important to consider when capacity constraints are present. First, it allows a strategy of offering a firm's some or all of a firm's capacity at the market reserve price.
We show that this type of strategy may be part of an equilibrium when firms are capacity constrained. Second, it allows for a discontinuous jump in quantity supplied up to full capacity for prices above those on the equilibrium path of prices.
assume that the price is p when demand is θ and ( ) S p units are provided to buyers. Otherwise, a uniform market clearing price, ( ) m p θ , is established when demand is θ that satisfies
It is possible that there is excess supply at a market clearing price. We assume a pro-rata on the margin (PRM) rule for allocating excess supply. This rule is commonly used in electricity auctions. Under PRM demand is first allocated to offers below the clearing price. Next, the remaining demand (quantity demanded at the clearing price less supply quantity offered at prices below the clearing price) is allocated to firms according to a pro-rata rule. If 0 p is the clearing price then the PRM rule yields sales for firm i as follows:
Supply Function Equilibrium
A supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a Nash equilibrium in supply function strategies.
In this sub-section we provide preliminary results on equilibria with differentiable supply functions, under an assumption that firms' capacities are large enough so that production capacities have no impact on the set of equilibria.
Assumption A1. Each subset of 1 n − firms has sufficient capacity to meet maximum demand.
Discontinuities in supply functions are important to consider when A1 is relaxed, as we explain in Section 4 below. 
This is a simple version of the differential equation system that has been intensively studied in the SFE literature. 4 If all firms utilize a common supply function, ( ) s p , then the system of equations in (3.4) simplify to the following single differential equation:
There is a continuum of solutions to (3.5) of the form:
We depict these supply functions in Figure 1 . The parameter ' p is a boundary price, representing the equilibrium price for the highest possible demand realization, for a particular equilibrium. s p ( ) is a symmetric SFE strategy for each boundary price p c p ∈ ' ( , ] .
5 Note that 4 This version is simple because there is no demand function term, due to perfectly inelastic demand, and because marginal cost is constant. 5 Since we allow supply strategies that are right continuous, the Bertrand strategy of offering units at marginal cost, c, is also an equilibrium. Symmetric equilibrium strategies are of the form, offer zero units for sale for prices less than c, and offer y units for sale for prices of c or higher, where
the set of symmetric supply function equilibria is independent of the distribution of demand quantities.
The expected payoff for a firm when all n firms choose s p ( ) in (3.6) is:
The supply function solutions in (3.6) are a special case of results in Rudkevich, et al (1998) . They derive SFE solutions for a symmetric model with zero demand elasticity and general cost functions (including multi-step marginal cost functions).
Following Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , the necessary conditions for maximization of 
where ' p and 1 2 ( , ,..., ) 
Capacity Constraints and Pivotal Suppliers
In this section we relax the assumption that any group of 1 n − firms has enough capacity to meet maximum demand. Instead we adopt,
We say that firm i is pivotal conditional on θ if ( 1) n k θ − < . When this inequality holds, firm i would be able to achieve a market price of p when demand is θ by submitting a supply function with some portion of its capacity bid in at price p , and sell at least ( 1) n k θ − − units.
We use the term "pivotal firm" to describe a firm that is pivotal with positive probability. In this section we focus on the symmetric case in which each firm has the same capacity; in this case, if one firm is pivotal then all are pivotal.
In what follows we examine how the presence of capacity constraints alters the set of equilibria. Consider a modified version of the strategy defined in (3.6).
(4.1)
The modified supply function strategy in (4.1) defines supply quantities for prices both above and below the boundary price. In particular, (4.1) specifies that a firm produces output equal to its production capacity for prices at or above the boundary price. This is the most aggressive supply behavior possible for prices above the boundary price, and therefore yields the lowest possible residual demand for rival firms for prices above the boundary price. Also, note that if all n firms choose the supply function (4.1) and if demand is θ then the market clears at the boundary price, p ' , even though there is excess supply at price p ' . This is true because the limit of *( ) s p as p approaches p ' from below is n θ / , and the PRM allocation rule gives first priority to supply offers below the clearing price.
Suppose that a firm's rivals adopt strategy , defined in (4.1) with boundary price, .
If the firm's best response is to choose with the same boundary price, then this strategy is a symmetric equilibrium strategy. In a lemma used to prove Proposition 1, we show that if the firm's best response differs from , then its best response is of the following form:
(a) follow for low prices up to some quantity, q, (b) supply quantity q for prices in the interval, , and, (c) supply quantity k at the price cap. 
The boundary price p ' is included as a parameter argument for payoff function w( ) to emphasize the dependence of this payoff on the boundary price associated with the strategies used by rival firms. This payoff function also depends on other parameters, such as capacity per firm, the number of firms, and the demand distribution. The function w q p ( ; ') is continuous and 
, where a is a positive parameter. A larger value of parameter a indicates that demand is more concentrated near its maximum possible of unity.
Numerical results are based on the assumption that total capacity is held fixed at 125 percent of the maximum demand quantity. For each value of n, the lower bound of symmetric equilibrium boundary prices rises as a rises. That is, as demand becomes more concentrated near its maximum value, relatively competitive supply strategies are eliminated as equilibrium strategies and the set of symmetric equilibria shrinks. Holding both total capacity and a fixed, the lower bound of equilibrium boundary prices falls as n increases.
As in the model of Section 3, if 0 θ > then there are asymmetric equilibria, in addition to the symmetric equilibria characterized in Proposition 1. The introduction of capacity constraints alters the set of asymmetric equilibria in two possible ways. Consider first asymmetric supply functions defined in (3.8). Obviously, output at the boundary price must be less than capacity for each firm (so that max x k ≤ ). In addition, asymmetric supply functions defined by (3.8) are equilibria only for boundary prices that satisfy a condition analogous to the condition inside curly brackets in (4.4). That is, a boundary price p ' associated with an asymmetric equilibrium must be high enough so that no firm would wish to switch to a different supply function that would yield clearing prices above p ' .
The analyses of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Fabra, et al (2006) for procurement auctions with discrete units of output suggest a second type of asymmetric equilibrium that may arise. Suppose that the demand distribution is concentrated near the maximum demand quantity, so that the following assumption is satisfied.
Under Assumption A3, a single firm is assured of positive residual demand at any price up to the market reserve price, for each possible demand realization.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption A3 there exist asymmetric equilibria in which: a) one firm offers no supply for prices below the market reserve price, and offers its entire capacity at the market reserve price, b) each of the other 1 n − firms offer their entire capacity at some price below the market reserve price, and c) the uniform market clearing price is equal to the market reserve price for each demand realization.
Proposition 3 is based on the following two observations. First, the high-price firm has no incentive to deviate from its supply strategy as long as rival firms offer their capacity at or below
. Second, the low-price firms have no incentive to deviate since each has sales equal to their capacity at the maximum possible price with probability one.
The asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 yield the highest possible industry profit; all potential surplus is extracted in the form of profit for firms. Note, however, that the distribution of profit may be quite uneven across firms. If the lowest possible demand quantity is only slightly greater than capacity for one firm, then the high-price firm will earn profit that is a small fraction of the profit earned by each other firm in equilibrium.
8
Extensions and Discussion
Asymmetric Capacities
Concerns about market power in wholesale electricity markets have often focused on the largest firms (e.g., see Lave and Perekhodtsev (2001) ). Firms with the greatest generation capacity appear to be most likely to be able to force up the market price by withholding production. However there is relatively little analysis of models in which firms have asymmetric capacities in the SFE literature. 9 An exception is a recent paper by Anderson and Hu (2008) that reports SFE results for particular configurations of asymmetric capacities and costs. They propose a new numerical method to calculate asymmetric SFE using an approximation technique for solving differential equations. They implement their method on several numerical examples.
We focus on duopoly markets in which firms differ only in capacities. We assume that firm 1 has more capacity than firm 2. We also assume that 1 2 2
then symmetric supply function equilibria are feasible, since each firm has enough capacity to meet at least one-half of maximum demand. Symmetric equilibria are defined in Proposition 1, using
Proposition 2 indicates that the lower bound of the set of symmetric equilibrium boundary prices is decreasing in 2 K for
8 Note that the asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 rely on our definition of the set of supply strategies, which permits discontinuous supply functions. 9 Green and Newbery (1992) discuss equilibria for asymmetric duopoly. They write that it is, "… more difficult to solve for the pair of (differential) equations for the asymmetric equilibrium than the single equation for the symmetric equilibrium, and the rest of the paper will restrict attention to the symmetric case." Baldick and Hogan (2002) also consider asymmetries in capacities and cost functions. However they note that the differential equation approach of solving for supply functions may not be effective because the resulting supply functions often fail the non-decreasing property.
There may also be asymmetric equilibria, depending on the value of θ . If
the only possible pure strategy equilibria are asymmetric. Equation (3.8) specifies smooth supply functions that can be asymmetric equilibrium strategies when firms have different outputs at the boundary price. In addition to the conditions in (3.9), strategies would need to satisfy the following two conditions in order to be asymmetric equilibrium strategies:
The boundary price ' p is high enough so that neither firm wishes to deviate to a strategy that yields prices above ' p . There may also be asymmetric equilibria in which the equilibrium price is equal to the market reserve price with probability one, as in Proposition 3. If
then there is an equilibrium in which firm one submits a supply function with zero output for prices below the market reserve price and output equal to capacity at the market reserve price. Firm two submits a supply curve such that firm one has no incentive to offer output at lower prices than firm two offers its capacity. If
then there are asymmetric equilibria in which either firm plays a "high-price" strategy and its rival plays a "low-price" strategy.
If 1 2 2 K θ < then existence of a pure strategy equilibrium depends on the support of the demand distribution. Specifically, the following condition must be satisfied for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium:
If (5.1) does not hold then a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. It is possible that mixed strategy equilibria exist, but we do not attempt to identify or characterize such equilibria. 
Symmetric Firms with Step Marginal Costs
In preceding sections we assumed that all firms have a common, constant marginal cost c for production up to capacity. Our approach can be extended to the case in which firms have multi-step marginal cost functions. Rudkevich, et al (1998) derive SFE results for a multi-step marginal cost model with identical firms. Genc (2003) examines the impact of pivotal firms on the set of supply function equilibria when each firm has a two-step marginal cost schedule comprised of low-cost (base load) generation units and higher cost (peak load) units. We summarize two key findings from Genc (2003) . First, with rising marginal cost steps, even the most competitive symmetric SFE yields positive profits since market clearing prices are above marginal cost for low cost units. As a consequence, the presence of pivotal firms may not have any effect on the set of supply function equilibria. This is in contrast to the constant marginal cost case, in which the presence of pivotal firms always eliminates the most competitive supply function equilibria (the lower bound on equilibrium markups is always positive if there are pivotal firms). Second, the fraction of total capacity that is comprised of low cost units has an impact on the set of supply function equilibria. By analyzing a series of numerical examples, Genc (2003) finds that the lower bound for the SFE initial price is non-increasing in the proportion of total capacity that is comprised of base load units.
Offers to Supply Discrete Units vs. Supply Functions
A supply function equilibrium formulation provides an approach for characterizing supply function strategies for infinitely divisible output in n-firm procurement settings. The present paper focuses on how capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers contribute to market power in a SFE model. An alternative approach is to model procurement as a n-firm game in which each firm submits offers to supply one or more discrete units of output. von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Anwar (1999) , and Fabra, et al (2006) utilize this approach.
We compare our results for symmetric capacities to those of Fabra, et al (2006) , who consider a discrete units model of a uniform price auction with n firms, constant marginal cost up to capacity, perfectly inelastic demand up to a price cap, and uncertain demand. Under Assumption A1, a discrete units model yields a unique price prediction regardless of the number of units per firm; namely, the Bertrand equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost. In contrast, a SFE model has multiple equilibria that include the Bertrand equilibrium as well as other equilibria with positive markups over marginal cost. Equilibria with positive markups in the divisible output model are sometimes referred to as "implicitly collusive" equilibria.
Under Assumption A3, pure strategy equilibria of the discrete units model are described in Proposition 3; these equilibria yield price equal to the market reserve price with probability one. These are the only pure strategy equilibria for the discrete units model; there are no symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. Under Assumption A3, our model with divisible output yields the asymmetric equilibria described in Proposition 3, symmetric equilibria described in 
Discriminatory vs. Uniform-price Auctions
A discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction format is an alternative to the uniform-price format. Under Assumption A1 there is a unique pure strategy SFE under discriminatory auction rules. The unique equilibrium involves each firm offering their capacity at a price equal to marginal cost (see Wang and Zender (2002) for the case of a sales auction). Supply function equilibria under uniform-price rules include the equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost, as well as other (implicitly collusively) equilibrium with prices greater than marginal cost. So, under Assumption A1, SFE prices for uniform-price auctions are greater than or equal to SFE prices for discriminatory auctions.
Genc (forthcoming) examines supply function equilibria for discriminatory auctions under Assumption A2, with the additional assumption that demand is uniformly distributed. He shows that a pure strategy SFE does not exist. He characterizes a symmetric mixed strategy SFE in which firms mix over horizontal supply functions. This mixed strategy equilibrium is based on the security profit a firm can achieve by offering its capacity at the price cap; security profit is equal to: 0, 1 . Under uniform-price auction rules, a firm can also achieve profit by offering its capacity at the price cap. As a consequence, expected profit per firm in any supply function equilibrium under uniform-price auction rules is greater than or equal to expected profit per firm in equilibrium under discriminatory rules. A corollary to this profit result is that expected equilibrium prices under uniform-price rules are greater than or equal to expected equilibrium prices under discriminatory rules.
Equilibrium Selection
Under Assumption A1, the symmetric model has a continuum of Pareto-ranked symmetric equilibria. If the lower bound of the support of the demand distribution is positive, then there are also multiple asymmetric equilibria that, for a given vector of boundary outputs 1 2 ( , ,..., ) n x x x , are Pareto-ranked. Suppose that the amount of excess capacity is reduced, so that Assumption A2 holds and A3 does not hold. Then some equilibria are eliminated; supply strategies that yield low prices and low expected profits are no longer equilibrium strategies. If firms are able to coordinate on the most profitable supply function equilibrium then the fact that some less profitable supply strategies are eliminated as equilibria when excess capacity is reduced would be irrelevant for observed supply behavior. 11 However, there are two reasons to question the ability of firms to coordinate on the most profitable SFE. First, as noted in Section 2.2, both Green and Newbery (1992) and Wolfram (1999) found that the most profitable symmetric SFE predicted prices were substantially above actual pool prices for the England and Wales wholesale electricity market. Second, evidence from laboratory experiments on coordination games shows that human subjects consistently fail to coordinate on the most profitable Nash equilibrium in some environments (see Van Huyck, et al (1990) , and Devetag and Ortmann (2007)). Failure becomes more likely as the number of players rises and the complexity of the environment increases.
Suppose that Assumption A3 holds. By Proposition 3 there are equilibria for which the price is equal to p with probability one. Expected profit for the firm that offers its supply at the market reserve price (the "high price" firm) in any such equilibrium is, 
Conclusions
We examine the connection between capacity constraints and the set of supply function equilibria. We include production capacity constraints in our model to allow for the possibility that a single firm is pivotal; that is, the firm can unilaterally move the price to the market reserve price with positive probability by withholding output, since rivals are capacity-constrained.
While other SFE analyses have considered capacity constraints, we argue that these analyses failed to properly account for the impact of these constraints due to a focus on local, rather than global, optimality conditions.
We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for a model with capacity constraints. We show that when the constraints satisfy a "pivotal supplier" condition, the set of symmetric equilibria is increasing in the amount of capacity per firm. We also show that the set of symmetric equilibria depends on the demand distribution and on the number of firms. This dependence of the equilibrium set on the demand distribution is in contrast to SFE models without capacity constraints, for which the equilibrium set is independent of the demand distribution.
We show that asymmetric equilibria exist for some configurations of the demand distribution and capacities. If the lower bound of the support of demand quantities is sufficiently high, then there are asymmetric equilibria for which the price is equal to the market reserve price with probability one.
There are a variety of possible extensions of our analysis. More general cost functions that better approximate costs of electricity generation from various plant types could be introduced. We could also consider the role that price-sensitive demand might play. We conjecture that the spirit of our results would carry through to more general models. That is, production capacity constraints shape the set of equilibrium supply functions via their role in limiting rivals' ability to respond to a firm's high price-low output supply strategy. Although our model provides some tools to assess market power issues in power markets, we also did not analyze the likely effects of other factors such as transmission constraints, and uncertain congestion and outages on supply function equilibrium predictions in the presence of pivotal suppliers. These issues are directions for future research.
Given that its rivals use * ( ) s p in (4.1), the profit maximizing price for firm one, subject to the constraint that price is less than or equal to ' p is * ( ) 
